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In this enjoyable and thought-provoking book, Simon Francis Gaine defends Aquinas’ claim 
that, from the very first moment of the Incarnation, Christ’s human mind possesses a beatific 
vision of God.  
Aquinas had taught that Christ had infinite knowledge in his divine mind and various kinds of 
knowledge in his human mind (1) knowledge from the beatific vision (2) divinely infused 
knowledge (3) natural knowledge based on his human experiences (ST, 3a., q.9). While 
Gaine questions (2) by asking whether Christ’s human mind required the kind of perfection 
divinely infused knowledge is meant to give (pp.154-5), Gaine accepts the motivation for (1). 
That is, since Christ’s salvific goal was to bring redeemed humans to the beatific vision, 
which they shall experience in their future glorified state (Revelation 22:4; 1 Corinthians 
13:10-12, etc.), it was necessary that he should have it himself; his beatific vision is the cause 
of theirs (ST, 3a., q.9 a.2). While most Catholic theologians agree that Christ’s human mind 
experienced this vision in his post-resurrection glorified state, many think (contrary to 
Aquinas) that this was not the case pre-resurrection. 
Gaine defends Aquinas’ claim against a host of objections. For example, in response to the 
objection that Aquinas’ claim has no basis in Scripture, Gaine cites Scriptural passages (e.g. 
Matthew 11:25-6, Luke 10:21-22, John 3:31-32, 6:46) which indicate that Christ 
communicated divine knowledge in a human way. Gaine argues that this implies that Christ’s 
human mind had some mode of access to the divine mind, and this mode may well be Christ’s 
beatific vision (p.40). In response to the objection that this account has scant patristic support, 
Gaine argues that the Church Fathers had to focus on other theological controversies, and that 
they did not actively advocate an alternative account (p.70). Gaine notes that alternative 
accounts utilizing psychological analogies have been proposed by myself and others. 
However, he claims (without argument) that such analogies are less illuminating, and he 
raises the concern that the application of some of them (e.g. Freudian divided minds) might 
encourage us to think of Christ’s human and divine minds as isolated from each other (p.72).  
In response, we first need to ask whether the distinction between Christ’s divine mind and 
human mind involves Christ having two consciousness or one. I explain in Loke (2014) that 
postulating an extra consciousness implies Nestorianism, and that the Divine Preconscious 
Model (DPM) provides a coherent account of a one consciousness model which illuminates 
how Christ could access divine knowledge and communicate it in a human way. On DPM 
Christ’s human and divine minds are distinct but not isolated; rather they are connected by 
one consciousness which has distinct divine and human aspects. 
Gaine argues that either Christ had certain knowledge of God by seeing the divine essence for 
himself in his human mind, or he had knowledge of what he did not see there by accepting it 
on the authority of divine knowledge (i.e. by faith) (p.119). Gaine denies the latter, arguing 
that the Scriptures never said that Christ believed. However, Gaine seems to have neglected a 
third alternative proposed by DPM: Christ had certain knowledge of God by occasionally 
accessing his divine preconscious as the Father permitted and by occasionally choosing to 
receive direct input from the Father, and that he communicated divine knowledge in a human 
way by utilizing his knowledge in his human preconscious. 
The key difference between Gaine’s account and DPM is that, on his account Christ was 
consciously aware of all things from the first moment of Incarnation (by seeing the beatific 
vision), which DPM denies. Gaine claims that the possession of beatific vision did not render 
Christ’s natural knowledge superfluous, for the latter gave Christ the possibility of knowledge 
of a kind that the beatific vision does not give: ‘of knowledge of things by finite means, 
properly expressed in human concepts and images, a knowledge naturally proportioned to the 
human mind and its perfection’ (p.151). Gaine suggests that Christ’s growth in wisdom (Luke 
2:52) can be interpreted as growth in his articulation of knowledge in communicable terms, 
effected by his drawing on his experience of the world. With regards to Christ’s apparent 
ignorance of the day of his coming (Mark 13:32), Gaine suggests Christ knew what the 
Father knew (which included that day) in the wordless beatific vision, but did not know it in 
any humanly worked out communicable fashion (pp.155-7). However, this suggestion does 
not seem to fit the sense of contrast between the Son’s cognitive state and the Father’s which 
is conveyed by Mark 13:32b ‘but only the Father’. Additionally, the Gospels’ portrayal that 
Jesus prayed in Gethsemane that the cup of suffering might be taken from him (Mark 14:35–
6) indicates that Jesus was unaware that he would indeed be crucified the next day (see Loke 
2014, 32-33, 119). This is inconsistent with the idea that Christ was aware of this through the 
beatific vision. 
A better solution is offered by DPM, which proposes that Christ was omniscient but limited 
in his conscious awareness (see Loke 2014, chapter 7). The Greek word οἶδεν which is 
translated as ‘know’ in Mark 13:32 means ‘to have realized, perceived, to know’; this word is 
often used in the New Testament in a general way, e.g. to know a person, to be able to 
understand/apprehend/recognize (TDNT vol.5, pp.116-119). Therefore, in view of its 
semantic range, in Mark 13:32 οἶδεν can be legitimately rendered as ‘aware’ instead of 
'know'. A divine person can use his omnipotence to restrict the scope of his conscious 
awareness as well as the utilization of his omniscience, and in this state of self-restraint the 
Son (unlike the Father) was genuinely unaware of the day of his coming; it was not a sham. It 
was a limitation he freely accepted, just as he freely accepted the limitation of having a physical 
body. Christ’s perfect humanity and happiness lies in his perfect human relationship with God 
the Father; this does not require always seeing the Father; rather, a constant state of 
obedience to the Father would be sufficient.  
 
Gaine ends his book by defending the compatibility of Aquinas’ claim with Christ’s human 
freedom and passion. However, he fails to address difficulties concerning whether his denial 
of Christ’s ability to sin would result in the denial of divine omnipotence (cf. Loke 2010). 
Gaine’s book contains precious insights on various theological issues (e.g. on what it means 
to see God) and on the views of many theologians concerning its topic. However, in my 
opinion his defence of Aquinas’ claim that Christ’s human mind possesses a beatific vision of 
God pre-resurrection is unsuccessful in view of the problems explained above. 
REFERENCE 
Loke, Andrew. 2010. ‘Divine omnipotence and moral perfection.’ Religious Studies 46: 525-
538.  
 
Loke, Andrew. 2014. A Kryptic Model of the Incarnation. London: Routledge. 
 
 
 
